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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-3088 
____________ 
 
MARYANN COTTRELL; RICHARD G. HOLLAND, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
NICHOLSON PROPERTIES LLC, d/b/a/ Hollybush Car Wash, d/b/a Hollybush 
Laundromat; GEORGE NICHOLSON, SR.; GEORGE NICHOLSON, JR.; JOHN and 
JANE DOES 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1-12-cv-02128) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________ 
 
Submitted April 4, 2019 
Before: CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG, District 
Judge.* 
 
(Filed: April 11, 2109) 
                                                 
* The Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg, District Judge of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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____________ 
 
OPINION** 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Maryann Cottrell and Richard Holland, now proceeding pro se, appeal the District 
Court’s summary judgment in favor of Nicholson Properties, George Nicholson, Sr., and 
George Nicholson, Jr. We will affirm. 
I1 
 Nicholson, Sr. banned Cottrell and Holland from his commercial property after 
they recorded (and reported) vehicles illegally parked in handicap spots on several 
occasions. Cottrell and Holland sued Nicholson Properties, Nicholson, Sr., and 
Nicholson, Jr. for retaliating against them in violation of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD). In response to 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Cottrell and Holland filed a “Cross-Motion 
                                                 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the ADA claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and supplemental jurisdiction over the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination claim 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the 
District Court’s summary judgment is plenary, and we apply the same standard as the 
District Court. E.g., Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). 
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of an adverse spoliation inference, Jutrowski 
v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018), and a district court’s 
determination on attorney’s fees and costs, Templin v. Independence Blue Cross, 785 
F.3d 861, 864 (3d Cir. 2015).  
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for Adverse Inference and Attorneys’ Fees.” The District Court granted Defendants’ 
summary judgment motion and denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion. Cottrell and Holland now 
claim the District Court erred because they: (1) are entitled to adverse inferences because 
the Nicholsons withheld video evidence and names of witnesses; (2) demonstrated that 
the Nicholsons’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the ban was pretext for 
discriminatory animus; and (3) deserve attorney’s fees under the catalyst theory because 
Defendants withdrew the ban during litigation.  
A 
 We begin with Cottrell and Holland’s contention that they were entitled to adverse 
inferences as to some videos the Nicholsons allegedly withheld, and as to witnesses the 
Nicholsons failed to identify. Appellants argue the District Court should have presumed 
that “whatever was on those videotapes and whatever would have been said at the witness 
depositions would [have] support[ed] Plaintiffs’ position.” Cottrell Br. 18.  
 The District Court disagreed, finding that an adverse inference was inappropriate 
for the videos because Cottrell and Holland failed to demonstrate the Nicholsons actually 
suppressed any videos, which were made at least two years before the suit was filed. The 
Court also denied their request for an adverse inference as to the unidentified witnesses 
because Cottrell and Holland provided no legal support for it, and the Nicholsons 
identified those witnesses when prompted by Plaintiffs in depositions. 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion on either front. Spoliation occurs 
when: “the evidence was in the party’s control; the evidence is relevant to the claims or 
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defenses in the case; there has been actual suppression or withholding of evidence; and, 
the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably foreseeable to the party.” Bull v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 2012). As noted by the District Court, there 
was no evidence the Nicholsons suppressed or withheld the video recordings of events 
happening several years before the litigation was filed. And their argument about the 
unidentified witnesses is unavailing because the Nicholsons provided their names during 
deposition testimony.  
B 
 We next consider whether Appellants demonstrated that the Nicholsons’ proffered 
reason for the ban—the duo’s harassment of customers—was simply a pretext for 
discriminatory animus. Cottrell and Holland contend the video evidence supports their 
pretext argument, as a jury might conclude after viewing the footage that they were not 
disruptive and the Nicholsons displayed animus against them. They also argue the Court 
erred by concluding that Nicholson, Jr.’s later treatment of them—which included 
harassment and efforts to interfere with Cottrell’s parental rights over her disabled 
daughter—did not establish pretext for retaliation.  
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants after 
applying the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973).2 The Court found that while Cottrell and Holland established a prima facie 
                                                 
2 The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to both ADA and 
NJLAD claims once a prima facie case of retaliation is established. See McDonnell 
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case of retaliation under the ADA and NJLAD, Defendants provided a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for banning them from the property. The Court cited the 
Nicholsons’ testimony that they decided to ban Cottrell and Holland because their 
behavior was alarming customers. Plaintiffs then had the burden of showing that the 
Nicholsons’ stated reason “was not the ‘true reason’ but was instead a pretext.” Cottrell v. 
Nicholson Props. LLC, 2018 WL 4062723, at *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2018) (citing Fuentes 
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994)). But Plaintiffs’ pretext argument “focuse[d] 
on why Defendants’ proffered reason should be disbelieved,” alleging that the video 
evidence shows they did not engage in misconduct. Id. After considering the video—as 
well as the duo’s contention that Nicholson, Jr. harassed them—the District Court found 
that Plaintiffs “failed to proffer sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder 
could conclude it was more likely than not that a ‘discriminatory animus’ motivated 
Defendants in banning Plaintiffs.” Id. at *11, *12 n.13. 
 We perceive no error in the District Court’s analysis. To establish pretext under 
Fuentes v. Perskie, plaintiffs must “point to some evidence . . . from which a factfinder 
could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the [Defendant’s] articulated legitimate reasons; or 
(2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating 
or determinative cause of the [Defendant’s] action.” 32 F.3d at 764. By merely pointing 
to the video evidence and their harassment claims against Nicholson, Jr., Appellants 
                                                 
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 541 A.2d 
682, 691 (N.J. 1988).  
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made neither showing. We agree with the District Court that the video undercuts their 
argument, as “a reasonable factfinder would find the video entirely consistent with 
Defendants’ proffered reason” because it shows Cottrell and Holland irritated customers 
and disrupted business. Cottrell, 2018 WL 4062723, at *11.  
Nor did the District Court err in concluding that Cottrell and Holland’s harassment 
claims against Nicholson, Jr. were “insufficient to show that Defendants’ decision to ban 
Plaintiffs from their property was motivated by anything other than unwarranted 
disruptions to Defendants’ businesses and third parties.” Id. at *12 n.13. According to 
Cottrell and Holland’s Second Amended Complaint, the harassment occurred about two 
years after the Nicholsons instituted the ban. Because the claims against Nicholson Jr. 
arose long after the Nicholsons banned Appellants, a reasonable factfinder could not 
conclude that discriminatory animus motivated the earlier decision to ban them from the 
property.3 
In sum, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants because Cottrell and Holland failed to show that Defendants’ legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for banning them was pretextual.  
                                                 
3 To the extent Appellants contend that the District Court abused its discretion or 
otherwise erred by not considering whether Nicholson Jr.’s harassment was itself 
actionable retaliation, Appellants present no legal support or citation to the record for this 
contention. We therefore decline to address it further. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8); 
United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 189 n.38 (3d Cir. 2019). 
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 Finally, Cottrell and Holland seek attorney’s fees under the catalyst theory, which 
applies when there is a “factual causal nexus between plaintiff’s litigation and the relief 
ultimately achieved,” so long as that relief “had a basis in law.” Singer v. State, 472 A.2d 
138, 142 (N.J. 1984). According to Appellants, “the nexus between the litigation and the 
relief is obvious” because they sought an injunction against the ban, which Defendants 
rescinded after learning Cottrell and Holland obtained counsel. Cottrell Br. 26.   
The District Court rightly rejected this argument because the Supreme Court has 
held “that the ‘catalyst theory’ is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney’s fees 
under the . . . ADA.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001). Although the District Court did not address the theory’s 
applicability to the NJLAD claim, this avenue is also unavailing because the relief gained 
here—lifting the ban—did not have “a basis in law.” Singer, 472 A.2d at 142. While 
Cottrell and Holland ultimately received their desired outcome, Defendants’ decision to 
lift the ban was not required by law because Appellants did not establish a legal basis for 
an injunction under these facts. See id. So there was no abuse of discretion to deny 
attorney’s fees.  
*  *  * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
